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To Talk Or Not To Talk?There were two remarkable attempts by Europe in March to enter into dialogue with the Belarusian government.First, EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana dispatched a group of aides to meet with Belarusian Foreign Minister Syarhey Martynau in Minsk. The visit followed Solana's cautious statement that he sees "some possibilities of doing or opening some relationship with Lukashenka." The results of this mission, however, have remained undisclosed so far. Second, the Working Group on Belarus in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) organized jointly >with the Belarusian authorities a seminar in Minsk on March 15 to discuss possibilities for Belarus within the EU Neighborhood Policy. This event was particularly notable because of the attendance of some representatives of Belarus's civic society and NGOs. It was apparently the first time since late 1999 - when the OSCE tried but failed to organize a dialogue between the authorities and the opposition ahead of the 2000 parliamentary elections - that representatives of the government and its opponents sat at the same table in Minsk. Nothing of importance has resulted from this seminar, but Bundestag lawmaker Uta Zapf, who heads the OSCE Working Group on Belarus, approved of it as of a sort of "experiment" that needs to be continued in the future. In fact, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly wants to hold another such seminar in Minsk in the fall. It is evident that Europe's hopes for a "new opening" with the autocratic president of Belarus have been stirred by the cooling of "brotherly ties" between Minsk and Moscow in the wake of the Russian gas-and-oil price hikes for Belarus in January. Plus, most likely, by Lukashenka's resonant interviews for the German daily Die Welt and Reuters following the energy prices row, in which he slammed Moscow for "increasing imperial tones" and hinted at changing his tack with the West. But anybody jumping to the optimistic conclusion that the energy dispute with Russia has made Lukashenka rethink his vision of democracy should read his interviews for Die Welt and Reuters for one more time. Despite his harsh epithets with regard to the Russian leadership, Lukashenka has in no place renounced his drive to seek rapprochement with Russia. And in no paragraph has he promised to mend his authoritarian ways. Indeed, in the interview with Reuters Lukashenka explicitly stated that the Western demands to democratize Belarus are tantamount to "dismantling" Belarus' political system. The point is that Russia's gas-and-oil price hikes have not affected the Belarusian ruling regime to the extent that it may feel urged to take some radical or unconventional steps in the near future, such as, for example, reconstructing the country's economy or slackening political repression. Judging by all appearances, Lukashenka decided to buy time by taking loans, including from Russia and China, to cover the increased expenditures for energy resources. There is a chance for him that after Russia's parliamentary elections in 2007 and presidential elections in 2008 the Kremlin's attitude toward Minsk may change to his advantage. In any case, this attitude should not worsen. A Russian nationalist group is currently promoting Lukashenka on the Internet as a candidate for the 2008 presidential polls - no matter whether the Kremlin likes it or not, the Belarusian president remains a factor in Russia's domestic policies that should be reckoned with. What are the lessons for Europe from this seemingly new situation in Belarus, which so strongly resembles the old one? First, Europe should not deceive itself by assuming that the gas-and oil price hikes have made Lukashenka's regime more vulnerable to external pressure than before. If the energy row with Russia in January 2007 has demonstrated anything at all, it was the fact that the Kremlin, like the EU, does not have any significant levers of influence in Belarus. Second, Europe should not deceive itself by assuming that taking some steps to please Lukashenka - for example, striking some Belarusian officials off the EU travel ban list - would make the Belarusian regime more cooperative and pro-European. The time between 1999, when the OSCE wanted to involve Lukashenka in dialogue on conditions of democratizing the electoral legislation, allowing the opposition to the state media, and loosening political repressions in the country, and 2007, when the OSCE essentially repeated the same demands, was filled by Lukashenka with a long string of repressive measures that all but obliterated Belarusian independent media and all but eradicated the very existence of independent thought in society. Unless Lukashenka backs down on his ways of treating political opposition or independent thought in Belarus as criminal offenses, talking with him does not have any practical value. It is apparent to everybody that the European politicians have already become strongly frustrated by their numerous failures to produce some visible change in Belarus. But yielding to Lukashenka even more that they had done so far seems to be an exceptionally bad medicine for this frustration. A much better idea might be is to expand the EU travel ban list to include more Belarusian officials who so willingly carry out Lukashenka's dictates. This article appeared in Belarusian Review, Vol. 19, No.1 --------------------------------------------- Copyright 2007 Belarusian Review All rights reserved. belarusianreview@hotmail.com Jan Maksymiuk
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