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President Lukashenka: Search for SurvivalIn the summer 2002 issue of BR, I wrote on this page that Lukashenka had three options to consider in view of Putin's proposal for integrating Belarus into the Russian Federation: accept Putin's demand, expand ties with the rogue states, or turn to the West.Lukashenka saw no future in accepting full integration of Belarus into the Russian Federation as this meant an end to his dream of ever assuming a seat in the Kremlin. He couldn't turn to the West with which he was at odds over its demand for democratic reforms in Belarus, which would mean the end to his autocratic rule. So he continued the game of being a union state with Russia, collecting Russian subsidies while expanding his contacts with countries hostile to the United States so that he could sell arms to them. (According to the American market intelligence firm Forecast International, Belarus is among the top arms exporting countries in the world. Russia had no intention of letting Belarus slip from her grip and realized its political pressure alone was not enough to make Belarus a part of the Russian Federation. The next step was to apply raw economic power. In January 2007, Russia stopped the delivery of natural gas to Belarus. Lukashenka immediately retaliated by turning off the flow of gas to Western Europe. This got Europe's immediate attention and the gas flow was restored. In January 2006, Russia doubled the price on its gas to Belarus and followed with the removal of preferential oil tariffs. The final blow came when Russia prevailed in forcing Belarus to sell a 50 percent share of the Belarusian government-owned Beltransgaz gas distribution network to Russian company Gazprom. The Belarusian government will receive $2.5 billion over a period of 4 years. (What's next on the auction block?) To mobilize public opinion in his fight against Moscow, Lukashenka turned into a "nationalist," defending Belarus' independence and sovereignty. To this end, he even invoked the 1994 memorandum on security assurances for Belarus, which the heads of state of the US, United Kingdom, Russia and Belarus signed at the Budapest CSCE summit, making a commitment to respect "the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of the Republic of Belarus." Lukashenka then began looking for partners with whom he could make a deal. He sought support from the EU and from countries hostile to the West, mainly Venezuela and Iran, both rich in oil and gas resources. He hosted Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez last year and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad this May, with both visitors proclaiming great unity with the host, opposition to the United States, and a promise to help solve Belarus' energy crisis. The US: The US position toward Belarus reflects a high degree of disappointment. High hopes in 1991 were followed by a 180-degree turn when Lukashenka became president of Belarus in 1994. Calling Lukashenka "the last dictator in Europe," the US Department of State naively thought that "Russia is a great friend of Belarus" and "cooperating with Russia can help democracy in Belarus" (Daniel Fried, interview with BelaPAN, Warsaw, July 11, 2005). On the eve of the last year's G-8 summit, we urged the US Department of State to place Belarus on the G-8 summit agenda, but our appeals fell on deaf ears. Only Canada responded positively with its Foreign Minister Peter MacKay raising the issue of the Belarus situation at the G-8 ministerial level. Most recently, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Kramer visited Belarus on April 23 and met with Foreign Minister Martynau, the deputy head of the Presidential Administration, leaders and activists of the opposition, representatives of the civil society and human rights and student groups, and families of political prisoners and the disappeared. At a press conference, he said the US was prepared to respond positively if the Belarusian government would take "minimum steps" toward democratic reform. Those first steps, he said, should include the release of all political prisoners and allowing peaceful demonstrations to take place. He stated that the US was prepared to increase pressure if necessary. On the way to the G-8 summit in Germany, President George Bush spoke in Prague on June 5, where he said, "... I want to thank very much the [Czech] government for stepping up and supporting those who +don't have the opportunity to speak for themselves, whether it will be the dissenters in Belarus or in Cuba." He also met with a group of some 50 dissidents from various countries, including Belarusian former presidential candidate Aleksandar Milinkevich and Ms. Iryna Krasouskaya, whose husband was among the disappeared. Subsequently, in his statements in Poland, Germany, and other European countries that he visited after the G-8 summit, President Bush referred to Belarus as a country with no freedoms or respect for human rights. The EU: Over the years, in deference to Russia's trade potential and its gas supply, the EU showed no interest in Belarus as long as the Russian gas passing through Belarus was arriving on time. It was only when Lukashenka got into a quarrel with Russia over the gas price hike, and retaliated by turning off the flow of gas to Europe that got the EU's attention. The other event that stirred up the EU was the rigged presidential election in March 2006 in which opposition candidates Milinkevich and Kazulin ran against Lukashenka with the opposition taking to the streets and occupying a main square in Minsk. While the world offered sympathy, Lukashenka retaliated by having his goons beat up the young people and sent Kazulin to jail for 5 years and others for shorter terms. The EU soon established contact with the civil society of Belarus with Milinkevich serving as the main link. Russia's backsliding from democracy was another factor having an effect of enhancing the fight for Belarus. Under the German EU chairmanship, the EU made clear that it was ready to engage in a constructive dialogue with Belarus if it would free political prisoners. Brussels could become tougher and cancel the preferential trade treatment with Belarus but that would deprive it of the only leverage still available. Conclusion: The whole national structure Lukashenka built rests on two legs; one of the legs is Lukashenka, the other, Russia. If one of the legs falters, the whole structure collapses. In the physical world, structures that are supported by three legs have a better chance of surviving an earthquake. Belarus is missing that third leg. Historically, Belarus belongs to Europe. Two centuries of Russian colonial rule doesn't make that less so. The period of colonialism is over, thank God, and the world should not stand idly by, watching while Russia tries to re-colonize Belarus. Today we have a community of democracies in Europe known as the European Union. The EU should get much more involved so that the police state under Lukashenka changes its ways and the Belarusian people are given a chance to join that community. This article appeared in Belarusian Review, Vol. 19, No.2 --------------------------------------------- Copyright 2007 Belarusian Review All rights reserved. belarusianreview@hotmail.com Joe Arciuch, Editor-at-Large
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