home    archive    search    downloads    subscription    contacts Features Belarus: An Outpost of Old Europe? Some people are beginning to ask the questions: What role will Belarus play in the European Union? Will it end up among the countries that former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld dubbed “New Europe,” or will it become an eastern stronghold for such states as Germany and France? The very question sounds bizarre since Belarus, which is referred to as “the last dictatorship of Europe” on both sides of the Atlantic, has slim chances of becoming a EU member in the foreseeable future. Yet the world today is changing so rapidly that nothing should be taken for granted. The dramatic turn in relations that occurred between such close allies as Moscow and Minsk in late 2006 and early 2007, as well as Alexander Lukashenka’s warming to the West, only shows that nothing can be ruled out. EAST OR WEST? Many Russian authors tend to describe the ongoing political struggles in Belarus in terms of an age-old confrontation between Rus (Old Russia) and Poland. Numerous studies are devoted to the analysis of “Polish intrigue” – i.e., Warsaw’s dream about the restoration of Rzeczpospolita to its former glory. These writers demonstrate a good knowledge of history. Indeed, they observe that in the early 20th century, Polish cultural and ideological influence on Belarus was as strong as Russian influence. A recurring theme in Tuteishya (Locals, or Natives), a play by Belarusian classic playwright Yanka Kupala, is the confrontation between East and West, personified by two respective scholars. The Eastern scholar, dressed in a poddyovka (a Russian light tight-fitting coat), and a kosovorotka (a Russian shirt with collar fastening at side), writes in his notebook that “the natural resources of Russia’s Northwestern Province are vast and abundant, but as for the province’s political borders, native Russians living here have a very vague idea about them; still, there is a pronounced desire to extend them in the direction of the West.” The Western scholar, dressed in a konfederatka (Polish national headgear – rectangular cap with no peak) and kuntush (kind of coat worn by Polish noblemen), writes that “natural scenery on the eastern outskirts of Rzeczpospolita is diverse and luxuriant, but as for the province’s borders, native Poles living here have a rather vague idea about them; still, there is a pronounced desire to extend them to the East.” The playwright’s sarcasm is understandable, but the symmetry of the characters’ perceptions shows that their cultural influence, at least, is approximately the same. It is noteworthy that even now, Polish authors seem to take no issue with the theory advanced by some of their Russian counterparts about Poland’s powerful influence on Belarus. Although no one dreams about Rzeczpospolita from coast to coast, Poland’s role as a guide to Europe, mentor in the art of democracy, and a kind of “big brother” for the Belarusians, appears to be desirable and even necessary. History, however, has played a nasty trick on Belarus’s two great neighbors: Both forget that since Kupala’s play [Tuteishya was written in 1922 – Ed.] the Belarusians have changed considerably. To understand the specifics of the Belarusian mentality today, it would be appropriate to consider the following excerpt from an article by Ales Chobat, which centers around a conversation between a Belarusian nationalist and a group of peasants soon after the country proclaimed its independence in 1991: “Alexei,” one of them asks, “who will be our master now?” “What do you mean, ‘master’?” the artist asks. “We’ll be on our own. Independent.” “Oh come on,” the man replies, losing his patience. “There are no questions about independence or being on our own. Surely no one is going to feed us. But who will be our master now?” “And what do you think?” the artist asked laughing. He liked the naivety of these simple people. “Ah, that’s why we came,” the villagers said. “Some people say that we will be under the Poles whereas others believe we will be under the Germans.” “Which would you prefer?” the artist asked. “It’s all the same to us,” they said. “But it looks like it will be the Germans after all.” “Why Germans?” “Well, how many Poles are there? But the Germans, they are a great force.” THE POLISH TRAIL The writer’s argument may not be very compelling, but even such an objective source as the census (1999) shows that Polish influence on Belarus is problematic, to say the least. Source: (http://www.polit.ru/research/2004/10/15/population_print.htm Why more than one-half of Belarusians speak Russian at home is a separate and rather uncomfortable subject. What is really striking about the figures given in Table 1 is that the share of ethnic Poles speaking Belarusian at home is higher than the share of ethnic Belarusians. At the same time, the vast majority of ethnic Russians speak Russian at home. If an ethnic minority is assimilated even more than an indigenous ethnic group, there is little cause to say that this minority has a particular strong cultural influence. During the 2006 presidential campaign in Belarus, many Russian publications repeatedly reminded their readers that Alexander Milinkevich, the main opposition candidate, was a Catholic. The record was never set straight (Milinkevich is an Orthodox Christian) partly due to the strange position adopted by many Russian media outlets during the election campaign and partly due to the aforementioned tunnel vision: all things pro-Western in Belarus come from Poland and Catholicism. This may be how the situation is seen from Moscow, but the Belarusian reality is somewhat different. Even the relationship between Belarusian Catholicism and “Polishness” is far more complex than it might appear to an outside observer. It may be recalled that the Belarusian national-democratic opposition, in the early 1990s, was the first to demand that the number of Catholic (Polish-born) priests in Belarus be reduced. Here is another revealing passage in an article by Piatrus Rudkouski, a well-known Belarusian journalist and member of the Dominican Order: “It has to be recognized that the consensus between the Hrodna clergy with respect to the mission to defend ‘Polishness’ is rather strong, while any attempts to introduce Belarusian at Roman Catholic churches are rebuffed by the uncompromising fighters for the status quo.” Carrying on the polemics with Roman Dzwonkowski, a Roman Catholic priest and professor at Lublin Catholic University, Rudkouski writes: “Does Dzwonkowski not know about the atmosphere of disdain for and discrimination against all things Belarusian that exists among the Hrodna clergy? Or has the respected professor never heard Polish Catholic priests quote with relish the admission made by one old woman: ‘Belarusian can be spoken in a cowb shed or barn, but never in the Catholic church’?” (http://arche.bymedia.net/2005-1/rudkouski105.htm). According to Rudkouski, “most of Lukashenka’s opponents are members of the pro-Belarusian Catholic movement. At the same time, local Catholics who identify themselves as ‘Poles’ are strongly attached to ‘collective farm ethics,’ which provides an excellent refuge for those unable to join broader cultures – Polish, Belarusian or Russian. These are mostly elderly, poorly educated people who promote an environment of ‘Polishness’ in the Hrodna Region. For these people, Lukashenka represents a guarantor of an accustomed lifestyle, while to Lukashenka, they are the most reliable part of the electorate.” The general tone of Rudkouski’s article is that nationalism, Catholicism, Poland and Europe are concepts that are not exactly identical, to say the least. Furthermore, the Belarusian Catholic intelligentsia is oftentimes especially wary of attempts to expand Polish influence in Belarus. Unsurprisingly, the problem as to which language is spoken in the Belarusian Catholic Church worries Rudkouski, who is a Catholic, more than it worries his Orthodox soul mates. It would be appropriate here to provide some general statistics about the “faith structure” in Belarus. The majority of the population is Orthodox Christian, falling within the jurisdiction of the Belarusian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church (between 73 percent and 80 percent). Roman Catholics are in second place (13-15 percent), and finally the Protestants, accounting for about 2 percent, more than half of them Christian Evangelists. According to the Committee for Religious Affairs at the Belarusian Council of Ministers, as of 2002, there were 1,224 Orthodox parishes, 432 Roman Catholic parishes, 35 Old Rite parishes, 491 Christian Evangelist communities, 270 Christian Baptist communities, 61 traditional Evangelist communities, 51 Seventh Day Adventist communities, 25 Judaic communities, 11 Progressive Judaic communities, 26 Jehovah’s Witness communities, 27 Muslim communities, 20 New Apostolic communities, 14 Greco-Catholic communities, and 13 eastern religious communities. One-half of Roman Catholic communities are concentrated in the Grodno Region, which has the highest proportion of ethnic Poles in Belarus (about 25 percent). But simple calculations show that Belarusian Catholics are not only and not even so much ethnic Poles (the latter account for around 4 percent of the country’s population, as compared to 13-15 percent of Catholics). But if being “pro-European” in Belarus does not mean being “pro-Polish,” what does it mean then? An answer to this question is partially provided by Table 2, based on a poll conducted by the Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Studies in May 2006. PRO-GERMAN Needless to say, the figures given in Table 2 are largely the result of massive state propaganda blackening certain countries that are especially disliked by the Belarusian ruling authorities. But it would be wrong to reduce everything to the manipulation of public opinion: Germany’s high ratings as compared to Belarus’s, for example, are clearly at odds with the objectives of state propaganda. Germany’s high approval ratings are also confirmed by other polls: Respondents generally see the country as a role model for Belarus, while German leaders (Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schroeder, and Angela Merkel) appear to be more popular than leaders of East European countries or the United States. Germany is among the top five countries in terms of “friendliness of foreign policy” with respect to Belarus – together with Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and China. This ‘Germanophile’ attitude is all the more amazing given that Belarus lost one in four of its citizens (according to some sources, one in three) in World War II. The war is still a crucial element of Belarus’s state ideology. The Belarusians’ geopolitical preferences were confirmed by a recent poll that was taken in May 2006. There are several points worth considering in Table 3. In polls conducted over the past few years, about one-third of Belarusians say they think the country should join the EU. But the actual number of latent pro-EU Belarusians appears to be higher: about one-half of respondents give preference to “Old Europe” (on the assumption that Belarus becomes an EU member). In another poll, respondents were asked what ethnic groups they were prepared to see as their sons-in-law, daughters-in-law, co-workers or neighbors. Belarusians seem to feel the strongest affinity for ethnic Russians, while the runners-up are Ukrainians and Poles. West Europeans ranked next (Britons, French, Germans, etc.), together with people from Central Europe (Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Serbs, etc.). Next came Lithuanians, Jews, Latvians, and only after them, Americans, natives of Central Asia, Arabs, Caucasians, and so on. On the one hand, ethnic Poles and Ukrainians rank second and third in terms of their affinity with the Belarusian people. In this respect, Belarusians differ greatly from Russians, who do not regard Poles as one of their own. On the other hand, West Europeans rank ahead of all other nations, while the reason for this is hardly their apparent affluence alone: the Americans, for example, are at least just as well-off economically, but the social distance between the two people seems to be considerably larger. Poles remain one of the closest nations to Belarus, but Poland’s powerful ideological and cultural influence is history now. Today, Poland is not much of a role model for the pro-Western minded Belarusians who are oriented mostly toward “Old Europe,” primarily Germany. At the same time, the obvious political distance from the U.S. is the result of official propaganda, among other things. Changes in Belarus’s political situation and its ideological guidelines may alter these geopolitical preferences but can hardly do so in a radical way. But if these guidelines remain essentially unchanged and Belarus becomes a member of the European Union, its role in Europe will differ substantially from that which is played by the “newcomers” (those admitted in 2004) today: Belarus will be on the border on “New and Old Europe,” an outpost of “Old Europe” in the east of the European continent. Yury Drakakhrust is a Belarusian journalist. Source: www.belarusnews.de, 12.06.2007 This article appeared in Belarusian Review, Vol. 19, No.2 --------------------------------------------- Copyright 2007 Belarusian Review All rights reserved. belarusianreview@hotmail.com Yury Drakakhrust Printable Version Counter: 1310

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