| home archive search downloads subscription contacts |
 | |||||||||
Lukashenka Tries to Break EU-US Ties“The United States of America, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland reaffirm their commitment to the Republic of Belarus, in accordance with the Principles of the CSCE Final Act, to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by the Republic of Belarus of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.This is the 3rd paragraph of the memorandum that heads of state of the US, UK, Russia and Belarus signed on December 5, 1994, at the CSCE summit held in Budapest. The full text, containing six paragraphs, was first published in the Winter 1994 issue of the Belarusian Review and some parts of it were republished later. It is regrettable that the West has so far not invoked the memorandum to protest Russia’s use of political, and more recently, economic coercion vis-à-vis Belarus. After ten years of maneuvering, Russia realized that its successful absorption of Belarus by political means was not in sight and had to switch to economic blackmail. First, it stopped delivery of natural gas to Belarus and subsequently doubled the gas price. Next, Moscow forced Belarus to sell a 50 percent share of its Beltransgaz gas distribution network to Russia’s Gazprom. Lukashenka stated that he would not trade Belarus’ sovereignty for Russia’s gas and accused Russia of breaking the 1994 agreement that it had signed along with the United States and the United Kingdom, in which it committed itself to respect “the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of the Republic of Belarus.” Looking for help in standing up to Russia, Lukashenka had turned to the European Union, but here he also ran into some difficulties. The EU showed little interest in Belarus as long as Russian gas was reaching Europe without interruption. Lukashenka got the EU’s attention only when — during his quarrel with Russia over a gas price hike — he briefly turned off the gas flow to Europe. The blatantly rigged presidential election in March 2006 was another event that stirred up the EU. After Germany assumed the EU chairmanship in 2007, the EU made clear that it was interested and ready to engage in a constructive dialogue with Minsk, provided Belarus frees all of its political prisoners, including the former presidential candidate Alexander Kazulin, and eases up on harassing the opposition. This was a bitter pill for Lukashenka to swallow. So he mended fences with Russia and toned down his pro-EU rhetoric. The EU, to show it meant business, reduced Belarus’ benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and increased prices for visas — this in addition to the existing list banning certain Belarusian officials from visiting EU countries. The US followed a similar pattern. When Deputy Assistant Secretary of State David Kramer visited Belarus in April 2007, he said that the US was prepared to respond positively provided the Belarusian government would take “minimum steps” toward democratic reforms. Those first steps, he said, should include releasing all political prisoners and allowing peaceful demonstrations to take place. He stated that the United States was prepared to increase pressure if necessary. Seeing no response, Washington decided in November 2007 to impose sanctions against Belnaftakhim, a state controlled oil company, freezing any assets it had under US jurisdiction. While Lukashenka had been trying to rebuild ties with the West by gradually releasing political activists — but still holding Kazulin — Moscow suddenly decided to act. Just in the single month of December 2007, the Russian prime minister condemned US economic sanctions against Belarus; Putin paid a visit to Minsk; the Belarus’ ambassador to the US, Mikhail Khvastou, accused the United States of violating the 1994 agreement by applying economic sanctions against his country; and Lukashenka threatened to expel the US ambassador, Karen Stewart, if the US were to strengthen its sanctions. This year, February became another month of intense activity. Belarusian Foreign Minister Siarhei Martynau paid a two-day unofficial visit to Berlin where he discussed the steps leading to a dialogue between Belarus and the EU. On March 6, Putin telephoned Lukashenka. According to BelTA, they discussed the establishment of the “union state”; strengthening trade and economic relations; cooperation in humanitarian and joint security sectors; harmonizing actions in foreign policy; and “the present condition and perspective development of Belarus’ relations with certain Western countries.” On March 7, two significant events took place. The Belarusian foreign ministry announced that Belarus was recalling its ambassador from Washington for “consultations” and “recommended” that the US follow suit. The other event, perhaps by coincidence, was reaching agreement to establish the European Commission’s office in Minsk, concluded at the Commission’s office in Brussels. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the European Union’s commissioner for external relations, expressed hope that the opening of the office in Minsk “will help create the conditions in which our relationship can grow and help the EU to reinforce its ties with the citizens of Belarus.” On March 10, Lukashenka met with a delegation of British members of parliament and business people in Minsk, where he declared that “prospects for relations between Belarus and the EU will depend on whether the European Union’s foreign policy is independent of that the United States.” On March 11, the Belarus’foreign ministry informed Karen Stewart that she should leave Minsk within 24 hours. She left March 12 for Vilnius and from there she went to Brussels, joining Assistant Secretary of State David Kramer for consultations with the EU. The consultations took place March 14, with the result that the EU and US agreed that no dialogue with Belarus should start until Kazulin is freed. All the events that followed Putin’s visit to Minsk last December and his follow up call to Lukashenka March 6 have led some analysts to conclude that Moscow is firmly behind the current drive to separate the US from the EU. The drive’s probable aim is to block the installation of US antimissile sites in Poland and the Czech Republic; and to undermine the US plan for rebuilding the Polish military, recently announced by President Bush; and, most fundamentally, to continue Moscow’s push for restoration of its de facto hegemony in eastern Europe and big power status beyond. Joe Arciuch, Editor-at-Large This article appeared in Belarusian Review, Vol. 20, No.1 --------------------------------------------- Copyright 2007 Belarusian Review All rights reserved. belarusianreview@hotmailcom Joe Arciuch, Editor-at-Large
|
|||||||||
| Rubriques |
Belarusian Culture
Belarusians Abroad
Contents
Economy
Editorial
Features
Chronicle of Events
Legacy of Chernobyl
Letters
Media Watch
News Briefs
- Culture & Society
- Freedom of Religion
- Independent Media
- Belarus & the World
- Human Rights
- Politics - Opposition
- Politics - Regime
Thoughts and Observations
| New Articles |
| Milinkevich: Democracy Ensured on the Streets (06.07.2010) |
| Belarus: Open for Business? (06.07.2010) |
| Eastern Partnership ‘Absolutely a Success’ (06.07.2010) |
| Customs Union instead of WTO? (06.07.2010) |
| Oil “Export” Duties: Peculiarity of the Russian-Led Customs Union (06.07.2010) |
| BNR Rada On Nuclear Power in Belarus (06.07.2010) |
| 600th Anniversary of the Grunwald Battle (06.07.2010) |
| Ivonka Survilla Reelected President of BNR Rada (06.07.2010) |
| PACE Suspends its High-Level Contacts with the Belarusian Government and Parliament (05.07.2010) |
| Belarusian LACINKA - Its Second Wind (05.07.2010) |
| Democracy Needs to Feel US Support (05.07.2010) |
| Belarusians in the Battle of Grunwald (02.07.2010) |
| Fate of Isolated Minorities: Lusatia - Podlachia (02.07.2010) |
| National Park ”Bielaviežskaja Pušča” and the Council Of Europe Diploma (02.07.2010) |
| Belarus Gears Up For Presidential Elections (02.07.2010) |
| Readers' Favorites |
| Kitabs, the Unique Phenomenon of the Belarusian Language in "Encyclopedia of the Belarusian language" (11277) |
| The Exchange Rate Policy for Belarus (11215) |
| Belarusian Weapons Exports:A Possible Source of Laundered Funds? (10630) |
| Vaclav Havel - in Defense of Jakub Kolas Humanities Lyceum (10278) |
| Belarusica at the AAASS Convention (10207) |
| Putin Doctrine: Immediate Threat to Belarus (9879) |
| Belarusian Currency: Problems and Perspectives (9798) |
| Is Lukashenka Winning Back Hearts and Minds? (9619) |
| Minsk Wants Compensation from Moscow for Abandoning National Currency (9189) |
| DZIADY and Kurapaty Unite the Opposition (9169) |
| Opposition Forms New Pro-European Alliance (9151) |
| Belarus Represented in the World Book Fair (9111) |
| The Sad State of Agriculture (8564) |
| EU Aid Misuse Fears (8221) |
| The Third Wave, or the regimes current tactics in dealing with independent NGOs (8120) |