Moving Away From Russia
Two important developments took place in Belarusian politics within the space of several recent weeks.
First, on May 7 Belarus signed a document on joining the Eastern Partnership initiative — a peculiar "waiting room" for six post-Soviet countries that might aspire to full-fledged EU membership in some indefinite future.
Second, on June 14 Belarus refused to sign a document on creating the so-called Collective Rapid-Response Forces — a Eurasian answer to the seven-nation Collective Security Treaty Organization of NATO.
Both developments may seem to be more of a symbolic than a practical significance. The Eastern Partnership does not offer any substantial financial or economic incentives to the post-Soviet signatories. The Collective Rapid-Response Forces do not offer any substantial counterbalance or pose any substantial threat to NATO forces in Europe. But in making his decisions on both issues, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka has proven in practice that integration with Russia is not the only possible or the only desirable option for his country. These decisions may, in the long run, mark a turning point in Belarus's foreign policy.
In making his recent advances to Europe, Lukashenka had to swallow his autocratic ego. And he did that. Brussels invited Belarus to the Eastern Partnership but, at the same time, unambiguously suggested that it would be deeply embarrassed if Lukashenka appeared at the May 7 summit in Prague in person. Mercifully, and prudently, Lukashenka took the hint. He sent a deputy prime minister to Prague to sign the Eastern Partnership declaration.
Lukashenka also had to withstand the Kremlin's subdued dissatisfaction with the Eastern Partnership before the Prague summit and the Kremlin's untamed ire after the summit. He did not recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia before the summit. And he made an even more unprecedented step to spurn the Collective Security Treaty Organization after the Kremlin put economic pressure on Belarus by embargoing Belarusian dairy products and withholding a $500 million loan installment.
Such a behavior surely warranted a reward from the West, and it was not long in coming. The International Monetary Fund said in June that it will lend an additional $1 billion to Belarus, bringing its total loan to $3.4 billion.
Where do these developments leave the Belarusian opposition, whose hopes for change in Belarus were during many years anchored in the conviction that the only efficient way for the West to deal with Lukashenka was to isolate him?
There is no simple or brief answer to this question.
It is evident that in his domestic policies, whether economic or social, Lukashenka is not going to importantly diminish his grip over the country or give a significant role in the public life for his opponents.
But it is also evident that, at least for Brussels, the isolation of Lukashenka is already a thing of the past. Therefore, it would be advisable for the opposition to make some conclusions from this less-than-expected turnaround of Lukashenka's political fortune.
The first prominent oppositionist in Belarus to make such conclusions was Alyaksandr Milinkevich, who has started to campaign for Belarus' greater engagement with the European Union, even at the expense of some legitimization of the autocratic regime in the international arena.
Will the others follow? Most likely, veterans of the opposition -- for example, Barshcheuski's and Paznyak's wings of the Belarusian Popular Front -- won't be eager to make such a step. Because such a step would mean losing their credibility and support they still have in society.
But younger opposition activists are more likely to side with Milinkevich's and his pragmatic political vision.
This vision implicitly acknowledges that the opposition is currently too weak to change the political regime in the country. But this vision also presumes that the opposition is sufficiently potent to contribute to the change that is currently taking shape in Belarus. Belarus has manifestly begun to move further away from Russia. It would be advisable for the opposition to help accelerate this movement, not to hamper it.
This article appeared in
Belarusian Review, Vol. 21, No. 2
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Jan Maksymiuk
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