The Belarusian People: Between a Rock and Hard Place
The recent publication in Poland of an open letter to the administration of President Obama signed by 22 foreign policy and national security elites from the newer NATO and EU member states of Central and Eastern Europe attracted considerable attention on both sides of the Atlantic. Most of the issues touched on in the letter deal one way or the other with Russia--its present and possible future relations with their countries--within the broader context of their places in the transatlantic community.
Unfortunately, the thrust of the elites’ letter strongly suggested acceptance of a dynamic comprising the transatlantic community (NATO and/or EU members) on one side and Russia on the other. The letter, in particular, contains no input from elites of the other six Eastern European countries having status in neither “camp”--Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine. The only reference to any of them pertains to the 2008 Russo-Georgia war. The six “Outsiders” include countries--Belarus and Ukraine--with the longest and most severe exposure to Soviet realities. Even today, nearly 18 years after the demise of the USSR, they remain severely crippled in key aspects of nation-building by those realities.
For them, in many important respects there is little objective difference between Soviet Russia and post-Soviet Russia. All six “Outsiders” are subject to Russian economic blackmail, for example Russia’s “dairy war” with Belarus and its imposition of agricultural sanctions against Moldova, both politically motivated. Russia’s use of energy blackmail against all six “Outsiders” is chronic. And Russia’s strongly negative reaction to the EU’s laudable Eastern Partnership initiative exemplifies the official position of Moscow that it is, in effect, the “Hegemon of the Outsiders.”
Little known is the fact that in 1918 Belarus attained independence from Russia and national legitimacy. Forced out by overwhelming Soviet Russian forces in 1919, with its territory divided between Poland and the Soviet Union, the government of the Belarusian Democratic Republic has existed continuously in exile ever since. I have the honor of serving as the sixth in an unbroken line of presidents of that government. When circumstances in Belarus permit, our government will return its authority to a legitimate, democratic government as did, in their turn, the Polish, Czech, Ukrainian, and other governments-in-exile.
The implied juxtaposition of Belarus between the now-happy and secure NATO and EU countries formerly under Soviet domination on the one hand and Russia on the other by the signers of the open letter mentioned above is most unfortunate and hopefully was not deliberately intended. Whether intended or not, this presumptive bipolarism is fraught with the gravest danger for long-suffering Belarusians. Here is just one example: The proposed Russo-German “Nord Stream” gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea would, if constructed, deliver Russian gas to Germany and elsewhere in Western Europe, bypassing Belarus. This would mean, first, a loss in revenue to Belarus for the transit of Russian gas to Germany and beyond. This revenue has been used by Belarus throughout the post-Soviet period to help pay for its own gas imports from Russia. Worse, it will permit Russia to bludgeon Belarus politically at will with threats to cut off gas without fear of reaction in the West.
Through its long domination by Russia, the Soviet Union, and now both Russia and home-grown authoritarians, our homeland of Belarus is a special case and needs special attention. I discern that the present “constellation of forces”— economic, political, security — may be propitious for positive change in Belarus. One is the welcome EU Eastern Partnership initiative mentioned above. Another is the notably higher attention the U.S. is paying to Belarus. How the Belarus government reacts will be instructive. There are many signals it could give right now, if its intentions are sincere. For example, the absence of unfettered higher education in Belarus is a big problem area that could be eased through reasonable policy decisions and negotiations. There are many others.
I, my colleagues, and others in the Belarusian Diaspora on this side of the Atlantic look to the administration of President Obama for wise, prudent, and beneficial engagement with the government of Belarus — beneficial for the strengthening of civil society and for the attainment of a democratic, economically engaged Belarus that can thrive in its own neighborhood and beyond.
This article appeared in
Belarusian Review, Vol. 21, No. 3
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Ivonka Survilla
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